https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/will-multipolarity-follow-global-dollar-hegemony-by-carla-norrlof-2023-07
Currency,
Conflict, and Global Order
Jul 14,
2023CARLA NORRLÖF
America’s
pandemic policies and the broader response to Russia’s war on Ukraine have
unleashed widespread speculation about the future of the US dollar’s global
hegemony. Yet one should not assume that a more divided world will
automatically give way to a more multipolar one, especially where reserve
currencies are concerned.
TORONTO –
In this new era of geopolitical upheaval, business leaders, politicians,
policymakers, and academics are anticipating a more fragmented, multipolar
world order, with many predicting especially consequential changes in the
international monetary system. America’s pandemic policies and the broader
response to Russia’s war on Ukraine have triggered widespread speculation about the future of the US
dollar’s hegemony, and while warnings about the eclipse of the greenback are
not new, some commentators believe that this time is different.
True, high inflation, rising US public debt, and other key developments are
unfolding in a strategic environment that is increasingly reminiscent of the
Cold War. The most striking parallel is the return of great-power
rivalries and
policymakers’ preoccupation with security
concerns, which are
taking precedence over economic efficiency. But while the elevation of security
issues is clearly reshuffling some alliances and economic relationships, it is
unlikely that these changes will usher in a multipolar currency system in the
foreseeable future.
The biggest
problem with the narrative about fragmentation and an inexorable drift toward
multipolarity is its imprecision. The term “multipolarity” is rarely defined;
and even when it is, it is used inaccurately. Moreover, one should not assume
that a more divided world will automatically give way to a more multipolar one,
especially where reserve currencies are concerned.
SHOCKS
TO THE SYSTEM
The past
three years have certainly tested economic interdependence. Inflationary food
and energy insecurity collided with the US Federal Reserve’s response to the
pandemic, which included extending dollar swap
lines to other
central banks and lowering
interest rates through
bond purchases and other measures. These policies increased the supply of
dollars worldwide at a time when supply-chain disruptions were hampering trade
and driving down stock markets.
Worse, even
before the recent shocks, geopolitical tensions were rising amid spats over
trade and investment, as well as over the uses of economic coercion. While
relying on economic measures to achieve foreign-policy goals is preferable to
military means, it also risks infusing economic relations with conflict. In
this new
geopolitical game,
the United States, China, and Russia each play to their strengths, using the
levers of finance, commerce, and energy to create opportunities for themselves
and strike at other countries’ weak spots.
This trend
lends credence to fears about economic decoupling, deglobalization, and
fragmentation. On the monetary front, the worry is that countries anticipating
US sanctions will move
pre-emptively to
reduce their dependence on the dollar. China and Russia have been especially
energetic in pushing alternative currencies and building a multinational
financial infrastructure for trade and investment in renminbi and rubles. For
example, China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) acts as a
clearing house and
is thus similar to the US Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS).
Of course,
CIPS processes a mere 15,000
transactions per
day, amounting to the dollar equivalent of $50 billion, whereas CHIPS
processes 250,000 transactions per day, with a value
exceeding $1.5 trillion. But it nonetheless has laid the groundwork to clear
and settle more cross-border exchanges in renminbi. When China launches a
financial messaging system capable of working
independently from
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), it
will have its own complete, autonomous architecture for settling cross-border
transactions denominated in its own currency.
For its
part, Russia has already taken steps to bypass SWIFT, creating its System for Transfer
of Financial Messages (SPFS) after its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Russia’s central bank claims that demand for SPFS has increased significantly
since last year’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By the end of September 2022,
however, the system had only around 440 users.
Still,
owing to the new payments infrastructure and various bilateral agreements,
pursuing trade and investment in non-Western currencies has become somewhat
easier. Russia and China have agreed to trade in
renminbi; and
Russia and India planned to trade in their own currencies following Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine by reviving the Cold War-era rupee-ruble
mechanism. The
latter effort was recently discontinued, however, with both countries
routing trade through the United Arab Emirates instead, taking advantage of the
dirham’s dollar peg while avoiding explicitly settling trade in dollars,
rupees, and rubles. All told, such use of alternative currencies by third
countries remains small. While the renminbi is being used to settle a Russian
investment in a nuclear-power
plant in
Bangladesh, similar other examples are scarce.
Governments
are also making plans to move away from pricing oil in dollars, although the
significance of this development is easily overstated. Oil may be one of the
world’s leading export products, but it ultimately accounts for a very small share of total global trade.
More
broadly, because international currencies are, by definition, used by third
countries, adopting a trade or investment partner’s currency will not
necessarily raise that currency’s international role, even if it does reduce
the greenback’s relative role in cases where those transactions were previously
denominated in dollars.
GLOBAL
YUAN OR TOTAL YAWN?
Those
predicting the end of dollar hegemony also point to China’s own use of bilateral swap lines to allow foreign central banks
to acquire renminbi in exchange for their own currency. Making renminbi
available to foreign governments is a prerequisite for its use by public and
private actors, and the ability to act as lender of last resort in times of
crisis is a key reserve-currency function.
China has
also been maneuvering to expand its institutional footprint, such as by
introducing an emergency renminbi liquidity arrangement under the auspices of the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS). Similarly, the basket of currencies
underpinning the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights (SDRs,
the IMF’s reserve asset), now includes the
renminbi, alongside
the dollar, yen, euro, and pound sterling. And the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) have also discussed ways to push back against
dollar hegemony, such as by issuing a joint reserve currency to bypass the
dollar and other major Western currencies (as well as offering an alternative
to SDR).
Finally,
one of the most eagerly anticipated technological developments in this area is
China’s creation of digital payment alternatives. China’s central bank
began developing a
digital currency,
the e-CNY, in 2017 and offered this payment option to participants at the 2022
Olympics in Beijing. When fully implemented, the e-CNY will function
independently of other payment and financial messaging systems. By offering
cheaper, faster, and safer transactions, a Chinese digital currency could make
the renminbi more attractive and therefore more widely accessible and liquid.
Promoting the e-CNY for trade and investment could accelerate renminbi
internationalization.
But
underlying trade and investment patterns must change before the global currency
hierarchy does. Here, the China-centered Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, as well as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, could help
internationalize the renminbi by multiplying economic interactions and
encouraging renminbi use in third-country trade and investment. Still, in the
medium term, renminbi internationalization is likely to encounter substantial
hurdles, owing to China’s maintenance of capital controls and broader
balance-of-payments constraints.
MULTIPOLARITY
FEVER
Despite
these obstacles, speculation about a coming multipolar currency order is rife.
But what does multipolarity really mean in this case? Some prominentcommentators, such as former Bank of England
Governor Mark Carney and Zoltan Pozsar of Credit Suisse, neglect to define the
term precisely. Others foresee a system where a few currencies are
symmetrically distributed. And still others anticipate a world populated by
many major currencies.
Hence,
François Villeroy de Galhau, the governor of France’s central bank, believes we are moving toward a beneficial
“balanced multipolar system.” European Stability Mechanism Managing Director
Klaus Regling echoes this view, anticipating a
multipolar currency system “with about equal rates [of usage] for dollar, euro,
and renminbi.”
Those who
focus more on the number of currencies fulfilling reserve-currency status
include Barry Eichengreen, who argued back in 2009 that “the international
monetary system will become more multipolar” along these lines. But while
Eichengreen presciently predicted the renminbi’s rise as a reserve currency,
his implied definition of a multipolar system is problematic, because the
existence of multiple reserve currencies throughout the post-war era suggests
that today’s international monetary system has always been multipolar.
Identifying
reserve currencies is a necessary first step in determining the polarity of the
international monetary system, but it is not sufficient, because it does not
help us determine whether and when we have crossed the Rubicon into multipolar
or bipolar territory.
Polarity is
a term traditionally used by international-relations scholars to assess the
global, systemic balance of power on the basis of military might. But since the
concept travels well, it has also been applied to other areas, such as economic
power. In fact, it is particularly well-suited for characterizing the
international currency system, because great-power currency capabilities can be
used to enforce international agreements and police international order.
In a
unipolar currency order, one great power enjoys preponderance and has no close
rival. In a bipolar currency order, two powers predominate and have only
distant rivals. And in a multipolar currency order, more than two great powers
wield relatively equal influence. Yet this still leaves open the question of
how to measure polarity.
In the
accompanying figure, I have measured reserve-currency
polarity in
two ways to establish a unipolar threshold. The first panel counts the number
of great powers according to some predefined yardstick, singling out reserve
currencies based on their share of known reserves (with a 5% cutoff). A
unipolar line is drawn at a level where reserves in the leading currency are
twice as large as reserves in other major currencies. This standard offers a
clear-cut abstraction of unipolarity. Being twice as powerful as any
counter-coalition clearly renders a balance of power impossible and thus
creates stability by muting opposition.
But
unipolarity can also prevail without this rather exacting standard, as in the
right-hand panel. Here, the unipolar line is based on system-wide changes in
currency shares. A unipolar threshold is drawn at a concentration index of 40,
below which point the system no longer is considered unipolar, but rather
bipolar or multipolar.
There are
striking differences between the trend lines in the figure’s two panels, and in
terms of unipolar wiggle room. The “great currency” distribution measures the
relative influence of reserve currencies capable of playing an international
role. Here, the long-term power gap has been closing. In fact, we were skating
closer to the unipolar threshold before the pandemic erupted in 2020, and
before sanctions were levied against Russia for launching its all-out war
against Ukraine.
Now,
because the primary currencies comprised in this measure are all part of the
Russia sanctions coalition, attributing changes in this distribution to
sanctions backlash is a stretch. That brings us to the second panel, which
portrays systemic concentration, a measure of the relative influence of all
currency reserves within the system. Here, the long-term distribution of power
remains largely unchanged – though a post-pandemic, post-Russia-sanctions
decline is discernible.
If we base
our predictions about the longevity of the unipolar currency era on the first
panel, the situation looks rather dramatic. Even so, a dip below the unipolar
threshold would bring us to the world envisaged by Kroll Chief Economist Megan Greene: “In a multipolar world, we may
eventually be talking about alternatives to the dollar. But we won’t be
replacing it.” From the vantage point of the second panel, however, unipolarity
is as entrenched as it was before the euro launched.
DOLLAR
DOMINANCE
How we
measure polarity matters enormously for debates about the future of the
international monetary system. While polarity, understood as the distance
between the “great currencies,” has declined over time, it has not done so
since 2020. By contrast, polarity, understood as system-wide currency distance,
has been constant since 1995 but did decline from 2020.
Economists’
reluctance to define multipolarity has fueled a mania that is unhelpful for
adjudicating major US foreign-policy decisions. We are inundated by predictions
of a shift to multipolarity without knowing what it means, and when, in
reality, the eclipse of unipolarity would more likely be followed by a bipolar order fixed around the dollar and
the euro.
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Moreover,
it is unlikely that unipolarity will fade at all any time soon – or even in the
medium term. That will remain the case even in a more fragmented global economy
where security partnerships determine economic relations, and where sanctions
against Russia contribute to a realignment of some global currency holdings.
The pandemic and recent geopolitical developments do not justify confident bets
on the dollar’s demise, because the greenback’s centrality is mainly determined
by economic factors and an incumbency advantage that is reinforced by network
effects.
Remember,
today’s inflation is not just a US phenomenon, and when considering sanctions risk, diversification out of dollars
must be weighed against sanctions-induced diversification into dollars. The
coalition participating in sanctions against Russia accounts for more than 90%
of global currency reserves, approximately 80% of global investment, and 60% of
world trade and economic output. In a world where economic relations increasingly
have security overtones, the 60-plus countries under the US security
umbrella are
likely to stick with the dollar even if they oppose Western sanctions.
The stakes
are high. If a multipolar currency order was imminent, it would be reasonable
to call for a reversal of US monetary, spending, and sanctions policies. But
for the time being, the better bet is on continuing dollar dominance.
Writing for
PS since 2020
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